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Abstract
As one of the most popular statistical and machine learning models, logistic regression with
regularization has found wide adoption in biomedicine, social sciences, information technology,
and so on. These domains often involve data of human subjects that are contingent upon strict
privacy regulations. Increasing concerns over data privacy make it more and more difficult to
coordinate and conduct large-scale collaborative studies, which typically rely on cross-institution
data sharing and joint analysis. Our work here focuses on safeguarding regularized logistic
regression, a widely-used machine learning model in various disciplines while at the same time
has not been investigated from a data security and privacy perspective. We consider a common
use scenario of multi-institution collaborative studies, such as in the form of research consortia
or networks as widely seen in genetics, epidemiology, social sciences, etc. To make our privacy-
enhancing solution practical, we demonstrate a non-conventional and computationally efficient
method leveraging distributing computing and strong cryptography to provide comprehensive
protection over individual-level and summary data. Extensive empirical evaluation on several
studies validated the privacy guarantees, efficiency and scalability of our proposal. We also
discuss the practical implications of our solution for large-scale studies and applications from
various disciplines, including genetic and biomedical studies, smart grid, network analysis, etc.
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Introduction
The ever-increasing amount of data have posed great demand for effective analytical methods
to sift through them. Logistic regression and its regularized variants [1, 2] are among the most
widely-used classification models in machine learning and statistics. It has seen a wide range of
applications across various human endeavors, including genetics/genomics (e.g., genome-wide
association studies, or GWAS [3], gene-gene interaction detection [4]), epidemiology (e.g., [5, 6]),
social sciences [7, 8], information technology (e.g., computational advertising on the internet [9]
and personalized recommender systems [10]), etc.
Many of the aforementioned disciplines and applications rely on huge numbers of data
records (commonly referred to as large sample sizes in many fields) to make reliable discoveries
or predictions. The scale of data desired is often beyond the capability of any single institution,
and thus depends heavily on collaboration across different institutions through data collection,
data sharing and collaborative analysis.
However, data sharing and collaborative studies across different institutions bring about
serious privacy concerns, as most such studies involve raw data of human subjects that are
considered private and sensitive. In biomedicine, for instance, individual patient records are
highly sensitive and protected under stringent regulations such as the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [11]; Genetic information of humans are also deemed
highly sensitive [12, 13] and partially covered by the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA) [14]; in the education domain, students’ data privacy is strictly regulated under the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) [15]. In other domains, ignorance of data
privacy and misuse of personal information has even outraged users [16] and raised awareness of
regulators [17], as in the case of internet targeted advertising. Meanwhile, various high-profile
data breaches [18, 19] have exacerbated the situation, damaging the credibility of centralized data
hosts and analytical centers in upholding user privacy.
A classical approach to alleviating privacy concerns is by concealing individual raw data via
artificial perturbation (e.g., k-anonymity [20] or differential privacy [21]), Cryptography-based
methods (e.g., encrypting genetic data [22]), or distributed computing (e.g., private records reside
at local institutions only [6, 13, 23]). Increasingly, such protections often prove to be insufficient,
due to various privacy attacks [12, 24–27] leveraging numerous types of side channels (mostly
aggregate information or summary statistics), such as allele frequencies from published GWAS
studies and public reference genotypes of humans, correlation quantification between genetic
variants in the form of linkage disequilibrium (LD), regression coefficients or effect size estimates,
p-values, variance-covariance, etc.
Our work here studies the data privacy issues in regularized logistic regression [2]. Regu-
larized logistic regression is widely used in various domains, and is often the preferred model
of choice over standard logistic regression in practice [2, 4, 28, 29]. Despite its popularity, it has
received little investigation from a data privacy and security perspective. Our work intends to
bridge the gap.
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In this work, we show how to perform regularized logistic regression while preserving data
privacy. To do so, we adapt an efficient optimization method based on distributed computing [6].
The method partitions and distributes sensitive computations such that no (private) raw individual
data need to be shared beyond their owner institutions. This leads to better privacy protection on
raw data and orders-of-magnitude efficiency gains over a straightforward centralized implementa-
tion. In addition, we propose highly secure and flexible protocols to protect intermediate data
and computations from regularized regression model fitting. These altogether lead to an efficient
framework for safeguarding regularized logistic regression which provides comprehensive privacy
protection over raw as well as intermediate data. We focus on use scenarios where multiple
disparate institutions hope to collaboratively perform joint studies (ideally on their consolidated
data collection), however they do not want to disclose their respective data to others due to
privacy and/or confidentiality concerns. Such scenarios are ubiquitous in large collaborations
in healthcare, genetics, epidemiology, finance, network analysis and so on (as we will elaborate
later).
In summary, we consider our contributions to be three-fold:
• Firstly, we demonstrate that regularized logistic regression can be supported efficiently
without violating privacy. As mentioned earlier, regularized logistic regression is widely used
in practice and enjoys continued investigation from a methodological and computational
perspective, yet very few efforts have been devoted to address its related privacy issues. Our
work is the first to address such an important issue.
• Secondly, we present a secure and efficient method tailored for regularized logistic regression.
We adapt an emerging method of distributed Newton-Raphson [6] for our problem of focus,
enhance and extend its privacy protection leveraging strong cryptographic techniques [30].
Our resulting framework not only safeguards regularized logistic regression in particular,
but is also relevant to the broader community of privacy-preserving regression analysis
where intermediate data do not often receive sufficient protection.
• Lastly, we validate our privacy-enhanced regularized logistic regression extensively with
both synthetic and real-world studies. We also demonstrate its scalability to large-scale
collaborative studies, and illustrate its practical relevance to various applications from
different disciplines.
Materials and Methods
We first briefly introduce the necessary background regarding regularized logistic regression and
the model estimation process. Later, we will show how such a process can be adapted to preserve
data privacy without introducing significant computational overhead.
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Preliminaries
(Regularized) Logistic Regression. Logistic regression [1] is a probabilistic classification model
for predicting binary or categorical outcomes through a logistic function. It is widely used in
many domains such as biomedicine [4, 5, 31], social sciences [7, 8], information technology [9, 10],
and so on. Briefly, logistic regression is of the form:
p(y = 1|x; β) = 1
1+ e−βTx
, (1)
where p(.) denotes the probability of the response y equal to 1 (i.e., “case" or “success" depending
on the scenario), x is the d-dimensional covariates (or features) for a specific data record, and β is
the regression coefficients we want to estimate.
Regularized logistic regression [2, 32] shares the same model as illustrated above. However, it
differs in the model estimation process (with additional regularization terms added to the opti-
mization objective), which leads to some desirable properties such as better model generalizability,
support for feature selection, etc. As a result, regularized logistic regression is often the preferred
choice for many real applications in practice [4, 33, 34].
In this work, we focus on regularized logistic regression with the L2 norm [2], i.e., with
the regularization term equal to λ2 ||β||22, where λ is the regularization parameter and β is the
regression coefficients (note that incorporating other regularizations such as the L1 norm [32] is
also possible).
Newton-Raphson Method. A common way to estimate the (regularized) logistic regression
model (i.e., to obtain β coefficients in Equation 1) is through the Newton-Raphson method (or
the iteratively reweighted least squares method) [35, 36]. The repeated Newton-Raphson method
adopts an iterative refinement process that eventually converges to the “true" values of the β
coefficients.
To illustrate the process, we use βold and βnew to denote the β coefficient estimates for the
current and next iterations, respectively. Each step of the Newton-Raphson method can be
expressed as:
βnew = βold −H−1(βold) g(βold) , (2)
where H(βold) and g(βold) denote the Hessian matrix and gradient of the objective function
evaluated at the current estimate of the β coefficients. Details of computing H(.) and g(.) will be
introduced later.
Our Proposal
Here, we introduce our privacy-preserving approach for supporting L2-regularized logistic re-
gression, based on an adapted Newton-Raphson method. Our proposal was driven by two goals:
strong privacy protection and efficient computation. In below, we first provide a high-level
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overview of our framework; then we introduce the mathematical derivation underlying the
method; later, we describe the detailed computations occurring at each stage of the framework
and explain how data privacy is preserved thoroughly.
Hybrid Architecture. Our privacy-preserving method for performing L2-regularized logistic
regression features a hybrid architecture combining distributed (local) computing and centralized
(secure) aggregation (Fig. 1). It is motivated by the observation that certain computations of model
estimation could be decomposed per institution, resulting in institution-local computations and
center-level aggregation. The careful partitioning and distributing of computations significantly
accelerate the process compared with naïve centralized secure implementations of Newton-
Raphson method, while still guaranteeing the same level of, if not stronger, privacy. Similar
strategies of distributed computing have been explored in earlier works [6, 23] focused on other
analytical tasks and prove successful in practice.
Without delving into technical details, we first introduce our framework as illustrated in Fig.
1. The framework (and the underlying iterative procedure) consists of two classes of computations:
i) the distributed phase for computing institution-specific summary statistics locally at individual
institutions, and ii) the centralized phase for securely aggregating and updating regression coefficient
estimates. For each iteration, individual institutions independently compute their local summary
statistics (i.e., denoted as aggregates in Fig. 1. These can be local gradient and Hessian matrix
as introduced later) based on their own data, respectively. Such aggregates are then encrypted
(via Shamir’s secret-sharing [30] which will be explained later) and securely submitted to the
Computation Centers (typically multiple independent Centers are designated to collectively hold
the data for maximum security). The Computation Centers then collaborate to perform a series
of secure data aggregation on the encrypted data, and perform the Newton-Raphson updating
(Equation 2) to obtain a globally consistent β. In addition, model convergence checks will also be
securely performed. The new β (i.e., denoted as adjustment in Fig. 1) will then be redistributed to
local instituions for the next iteration. The above process of distributed and centralized computing
will proceed in iterations until model convergence criteria is satisfied.
Newton-Raphson Method for L2-regularized Logistic Regression. Our framework (Fig. 1)
leverages an adapted Newton-Raphson method for model estimation. Here we first demonstrate
how the aforementioned Newton-Raphson method applies to L2-regularized logistic regression.
Then we identify the limitations of naïvely applying the method, which motivate us to derive a
more efficient approach based on a hybrid architecture.
First, we reformulate the Newton-Raphson method (Equation 2) by defining a diagonal matrix
W as wii = pi(1− pi),∀i = 1..N, where pi corresponds to the probability estimate for the ith data
record (i.e., a row) and N denotes the total number of records. By expanding H(.) and g(.) for
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Figure 1. Overview of our secure framework for regularized logistic regression. Each institution
(possessing private data) locally computes summary statistics from its own data, and submits
encrypted aggregates following a strong Cryptographic scheme [30]. The Computation Centers
securely aggregate the encryptions and conduct model estimation, from which the model
adjustment feedback will be sent back as necessary. This iterative process continues until model
convergence.
L2-regularized logistic regression, Equation 2 becomes:
βnew = βold + (XWXT + λI)−1(
N
∑
i=1
(1− pi)yixi − λβold), (3)
where X corresponds to the design matrix (i.e., covariates) of dimension N × d, λ is the regulariza-
tion parameter for the L2-norm (defined a priori or derived via cross-validation), and I denotes the
identity matrix.
Traditionally, the aforementioned model estimation method (Equation 3) proceeds in a
centralized fashion. This indicates that all individual-level raw data are pooled into one large
(centralized) collection, on which the Hessian matrix and gradient are computed and the Newton-
Raphson updating applied. Similar approach is also commonly pursued by the privacy-preserving
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data mining community (e.g., [37]).
We point out that such a centralized approach could suffer from severe computational ineffi-
ciency especially for large studies with privacy protection requirement. In particular, pooling raw
data often results in datasets of large scale, on which secure computations can be prohibitively
slow (if not infeasible) due to the complexity of supporting matrix operations in secure. Conse-
quently, many alternative privacy-preserving proposals (e.g., [37]) do not seem practical especially
for large studies. Such limitations have been illustrated in subsequent studies even on very simple
analytical tasks [38].
Distributed Model Estimation. Observing the inefficiency of the centralized Newton-Raphson
method, we intend to accelerate the process by carefully partitioning the computations to extract
“safe” procedures that can be performed more efficiently without violating privacy. Such a
solution leads to two anticipated benefits: First, the majority of computations could be supported
without relying on expensive secure computation techniques; Second, careful partitioning of
computations guarantees the same level of privacy as centralized secure alternatives. We point out
it is increasingly the trend to leverage distributed computing for better computational efficiency
in privacy-preserving frameworks [38]. The partitioning of Newton-Raphson method has proven
successful on other simpler tasks [6] than ours.
To accelerate the Newton-Raphson method (Equation 3), we observe that the computations of
H(.) and g(.) in Equation 2 can be decomposed, such that some sub-procedures can be performed
locally at each institutions on their own respective data where privacy is not of concern. More
formally, the per-institution decomposition of computations can be expressed as:
H(β) = −
N
∑
i=1
wii(t)xixTi − λβ = −
S
∑
j=1
Per-institution Hj(β)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Nj
∑
i=1
wii(t)xixTi −λβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
All institutions
(4)
and
g(β) =
N
∑
i=1
(1− pi)yixi − λβ =
S
∑
j=1
Per-institution gj(β)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Nj
∑
i=1
(1− pi)yixi −λβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
All institutions
(5)
where S denotes the total number of participating (distributed) institutions and Nj denotes the
total number of data records for Institution j – it is easy to see that N = ∑Sj=1 Nj.
According to this decomposition, each institution can individually compute their local Hj(.)
and gj(.) on their respective data collections following their traditional practice. Later, the global
Computation Centers only need to securely aggregate these (protected) intermediate results to
derive the globally consistent H(.) and g(.), which would facilitate the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
In addition, the deviance test (for checking model convergence) [1] can also be decomposed
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similarly, since it depends on the log-likelihood which can be regarded as a series of sums.
Dev = −2 log L(β) = −2
S
∑
j=1
Per-institution devj︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ni
∑
i=1
(yi log pi + (1− yi) log(1− pi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
All institutions
, (6)
where L(β) corresponds to the likelihood.
Based on the above intuition, we introduce a hybrid architecture for supporting L2-regularized
logistic regression. The framework features an iterative process composed of two types of
computations: distributed (local) computation and centralized aggregation. In the following
sections, we will describe these computations in greater detail.
Distributed Computation. The goal of the distributed computation phase is for local institutions
to pre-compute their respective summary statistics. During this phase (Steps 3 through 8 in
Algorithm 1), each participating institutions compute their local Hessian matrix Hj and gradient gj
(Equations 4 and 5) using their own data. Local deviance test devj can also be computed similarly
(Equation 6). Since each institution has complete ownership over their respective data and no
data sharing is involved, such local computations naturally preserve privacy without requiring
computationally-expensive Cryptographic protections.
Next, all intermediate summary statistics (e.g., Hj, gj, devj) need to be synthesized and
processed at the center level to obtain a globally fitting coefficient estimate. To prevent potential
privacy inference attacks on aggregate information (partially summarized in [13, 25, 26]), we
require each institution to obfuscate their local summaries prior to data submission (Step 7 in
Algorithm 1) leveraging a strong protection mechanism known as Shamir’s secret-sharing [30]
(also introduced later). This mechanism ensures that all intermediate summary statistics (the
“secrets") are split into multiple shares to be collectively held by many participants (e.g., one
participant would possess only one piece of the secret). The actual content of the “secrets" can
only be recovered if the majority of share-holding participants cooperate to decrypt. This way,
even if there is collusion between a (minority) few of the secret-share holders, the system is still
secure. For our use case, we designate independent Computation Centers to be share holders.
Centralized Aggregation. Once the distributed computation is completed, the subsequent phase
of centralized computation should follow. As the first step, the Computation Centers will aggregate
the respective (secret-share-protected) data submissions in a secure way. This process requires
collaboration between the Centers who hold the “secrets". Once the globally adjusted H(.) and g(.)
are derived, the Computation Centers will perform the Newton-Raphson updating on the βold
estimate and check for model convergence afterwards. If the model is still not converged, then the
updated βnew estimate will be redistributed to local institutions to initiate the next iteration of
running.
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Algorithm 1 Secure estimation of L2-regularized logistic regression.
Require: Penalty parameter λ; Previous-iteration regression coefficients βold
Ensure: New regression coefficients βnew
1: while model not converged do
2: [Local Institutions]
3: for Institution j = 1 to S do
4: Compute Hessian matrix Hj
5: Compute gradient gj
6: Compute deviance devj
7: Protect Hj, gj, devj via Shamir’s secret-share
8: end for
9:
10: [Computation Centers]
11: Securely aggregate: H = −∑Sj=1Hj − λβold
12: Securely aggregate: g = ∑Sj=1 gj − λβ
13: Securely aggregate: Dev = ∑Sj=1 devj
14:
15: Securely derive βnew via Newton-Raphson method
16: Check for model convergence
17: end while
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Protecting Privacy
The presented framework involves various types of data and computations, many of which are
sensitive or quasi-sensitive. In this section, we analyze how privacy are preserved at each level.
Privacy on Individual Data. The hybrid architecture is designed in such a way that individual
raw data are fully controlled by their owner institution only, and no individual-level data sharing
is involved in any subsequent computations. As a result, individual-level privacy is maintained.
We note that decoupling from raw individual data for privacy protection is a proven and widely
pursued approach in methodological development in genetics and related fields, as evidenced
by [6, 13].
Privacy on Aggregate Data. We observe that various inference attacks on privacy are only
possible due to the disclosure of summary statistics. For instance, the genome-disease inference
attack in [24] relies on certain genomic summaries of case/control groups; it has also been analyzed
in [25–27] about the risks associated with disclosing summary statistics, such as covariance matrix,
information matrix and score vector. Meanwhile, we note that aggregate data may also constitute
confidential or proprietary information for some institutions and thus should be protected (a
similar opinion was briefly communicated in [23]). This is not uncommon for joint studies
in competitive scenarios, such as financial collaborations, healthcare quality comparisons, and
association studies involving sensitive and rare diseases.
Specific to our task of regularized logistic regression (and logistic regression in general), the
vulnerable summaries are the hessian and gradient, which collectively could result in inference
attacks on private response variables and model recovery [13, 25, 26].
To prevent potential attacks or confidentiality breaches, our framework encrypts summary
statistics from participating institutions (prior to data submission to Computation Centers) lever-
aging a strong Cryptographic mechanism known as Shamir’s secret-sharing [30](to be introduced
in the following section). The idea of protecting intermediate data have been explored be-
fore [23, 27, 38], however, mostly on simpler tasks (e.g., ridge linear regression, standard logistic
regression, etc) than ours; in a more related work [23], summaries from distributed Newton
method have been obfuscated, however, the protection is insufficient and easily vulnerable to
collusion attacks as we will discuss later.
Shamir’s Secret-Sharing for Protecting Data. In our protocol, we leverage Shamir’s secret-
sharing [30] to protect intermediate data (including summary statistics from institutions). The
general idea underlying Shamir’s secret sharing is that for a t-dimensional Cartesian plane, at least
t independent coordinate pairs are necessary to uniquely determine a polynomial curve. Formally,
a t-out-of-w secret-share scheme is defined as follows: we intend to protect a secret m (e.g., certain
institution-specific summary statistic in our case) such that the only way to successfully recover
the secret is through cooperation of at least t (i.e., the “threshold") share-holding participants (out
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of a total of w). To achieve the goal, we construct a random polynomial q(x) of degree (t− 1)
with the secret m embedded (we point out that the calculations actually occur in a finite integer
field. However, for presentation simplicity, we skip the technical details):
q(x) = m+
t−1
∑
i=1
aixi, (7)
where m is the secret we want to protect, and ai’s are randomly generated polynomial coefficients.
Note that the polynomial itself will be kept secret.
In order to split and “share" the secret, we proceed to evaluate q(x) and derive t or more dis-
tinct values from the polynomial, yielding coordinate pairs (1, q(1)), (2, q(2)), ..., (t, q(t)), ..., (w, q(w)).
Due to the inherent randomness in the specified polynomial, the coordinate pairs we obtain here
are random and reveal nothing meaningful about the secret. These pairs, each of which constitutes
a share of the secret, are then distributed to t or more Computation Centers, respectively (i.e.,
each participant only receives one piece of the secret). Under this mechanism, we can claim
that the secret is successfully protected, since no single Center or a limited few are capable
of inferring anything about the polynomial or the embedded secret. When it is necessary to
recover the original secret, t or more share holders will collectively perform Lagrange polynomial
interpolation [30] to uniquely determine the polynomial q(x). The secret will naturally emerge by
evaluating q(0): m = q(0). To facilitate complex data and computations in our framework, we
have extended the scheme to support matrices and vectors.
Privacy on Computations. Since all data in our framework are in encrypted form, special care
must be taken to support analytical procedures. Here we introduce several secure primitives for
supporting necessary computations without decrypting intermediate data. We focus on secure
addition and secure multiplication by a public value.
Secure addition is a fundamental building block for the central aggregation phase (Steps
11 through 13). Briefly, the primitive helps securely derive the sum A+ B without knowing the
actual content of A and B, since both of which are encrypted via Shamir’s secret-sharing. As
illustrated in Algorithm 2, the general idea of the secure addition primitive is to ask each share
holders to locally aggregate original shares of the two secret addends in order to derive new
shares, which will serve as the shares for their sum.
Algorithm 2 Secure addition (aggregation).
Require: Secret-shared data A and B (among w institutions)
Ensure: Sum sum = A+ B in secret-shared form (among w institutions)
1: for institution j := 1 to w do
2: [At Institution j]
3: Compute and store new share: sumj = Aj + Bj
4: end for
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To show that the secure addition primitive is correct, we assume the (secret-sharing) polynomi-
als to be qA(x), qB(x), respectively, for the two secrets A, B. In other words: A = qA(0), B = qB(0).
Since both polynomials share the same covariates and degrees, we have: qA(0) + qB(0) =
(qA + qB)(0). This indicates that, the aggregated coordinate pairs satisfy the newly defined
polynomial (qA + qB)(.) and thus represent the new shares of the to-be-computed sum A+ B.
Next, we show how secure multiplication-by-a-constant can be implemented, which is
required by the Newton-Raphson method. In particular, we consider multiplying a secret value (in
secret-shared form) by a known constant value. The primitive is surprisingly simple: share holders
only need to locally multiply their shares (of the secret value) by the public constant to derive the
new shares for the product of the two values. The proof for this method is straightforward, since
multiplication by a constant can be reformulated as a series of secure additions by the secret value
itself.
Note that in our current implementation, we take a pragmatic approach to security for
better computational efficiency without degrading privacy. Specifically, the primary reason why
protecting intermediate data is necessary in regularized logistic regression is due to privacy
inference attacks [13, 25, 26]. Existing attacks rely on both hessian and gradient to be feasible.
Our protection thus only needs to protect one of the summaries to prevent such attacks. This can
lead to significant speedup as compared to an encrypting-all strategy and our privacy protection
goal is still achieved. Extending our current implementation to a fully encrypted setting is also
straightforward, as the additional secure primitives (e.g., secure matrix inversion) have already
been demonstrated before [38].
Secure matrix inversion can be useful if we want to fully secure intermediate computations
(e.g., inverting the Hessian matrix). Several existing secure solutions [38–40] serve as our reference
that leverage methods such as LU-decomposition, Gaussian elimination, etc. Due to the focus of
this work, we leave it as future extension.
Since none of our aforementioned primitives change the original Shamir’s scheme, the
information-theoretical security still holds in our protocol. Interested readers are kindly referred
to relevant literature [41] for a detailed security proof.
Generating synthetic data. To allow for comprehensive evaluation on our framework, we also
generate synthetic datasets (in addition to other real datasets as introduced later) according to
Algorithm 3. We first generate coefficients and covariates at random (according to uniform and
Gaussian distributions, respectively). Later, based on the calculated probabilities, we generate the
response variables from the Bernoulli distribution. The resulting synthetic dataset is partitioned
per institution.
Results
We have implemented our privacy-preserving framework for L2-regularized logistic regression.
To validate our proposal, we performed extensive empirical evaluation on both synthetic and
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Algorithm 3 Generate synthetic data
Require: Covariate dimensionality d
Ensure: Covariates X, responses y (both partitioned per-institution)
1: Generate coefficients β ∈ Rd at random
2: for institution j := 1 to S do
3: Generate covariates covj ∈ RNj×(d−1) from N (µ, σ2)
4: Output concatenated covariates Xj =
[
1 covj
]
∈RNj×d
5: Calculate probabilities pj = 1/(1+ e−β
TXj)∈RNj
6: Generate and output response variables yj∈RNj from Bernoulli(pj)
7: end for
real-world studies. We report on the evaluations in terms of result accuracy, computational
efficiency, as well as scalability to large studies.
Evaluation Datasets
Included in our empirical evaluation are four studies, which represent a wide spectrum of
applications from different domains and data scales. In specific,
• The Synthetic dataset is a large-scale dataset we generated at random according to Algo-
rithm 3. It consists of 1 million records spanning 6 features from 6 institutions.
• The Insurance dataset [42] is a dataset from an insurance company with the goal of pre-
dicting users’ insurance policy status based on socio-demographic features. It contains
9,822 records and 84 features, and we simulated 5 institutions by randomly partitioning the
dataset horizontally.
• The Parkinsons.Motor and Parkinsons.Total datasets both relate to one dataset targeted for
predicting parkinson’s tele-monitoring quantities, with 5,875 samples spanning 20 features
[43]. Since there are two distinct target predictions in the original dataset, we partition the
dataset into two sub-studies which we denote as Parkinsons.Motor (for predicting motor
UPDRS) and Parkinsons.Total (for total UPDRS). They share the same covariates but with
different response variables. We randomly partitioned the records among 5 institutions.
Regression Result Accuracy
The first question we consider in validating our framework is whether the regression result is
accurate and reliable. To answer this question, we compare our estimated regression coefficients
with that obtained from standard software packages. As illustrated in Fig. 2, our framework yields
identical results to the expected ground truth across all evaluations (with correlation R2 = 1.00).
The result accuracy is also evidenced by the mathematical proof explained earlier, where we
13
have shown that our distributed model estimation method follows an exact derivation and no
approximation is involved in the secure computation procedures.
Figure 2. Model accuracy of our securely estimated β against the gold standard for four
evaluation datasets. As illustrated, the regression coefficients estimated via our secure framework
are identical to the gold standards, with correlation R2 = 1.00.
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Running Time
We implemented the prototype in R and Scala, a Java Virtual Machine-based programming
language. Experiments were performed on a quad-core computer with 2.4GHz CPU and 8GB
memory, running Ubuntu 13.04. To eliminate network latency effects, we simulated distributed
computing nodes on a single computer and report the network data exchanged. We performed
each experiment several times and reported the mean of the running time.
Empirical evaluation indicates that our protocol is highly efficient, as demonstrated in Table
1. For datasets with as many as 1 million records, our protocol completed in less than 12 seconds.
For datasets of more modest sizes as typically found in everyday applications, our protocol took
only around 2 ∼ 4 seconds or less.
Since our framework is focused on a novel analytical application that is not addressed in the
privacy/security domain, technically we do not have any alternatives to compare against. We do
however, try to provide brief comparisons against similar secure approaches in related problems
– mostly from linear (ridge) regression which also considered regularization. Our evaluation
indicate that our protocol is more efficient than other related secure proposals (even though they
focused on much simpler regression models). For instance, as a rough comparison, secure linear
regression in [39] on 51,016 samples with 22 covariates took two days. Our framework is also
competitive compared with the state-of-the-art secure solution for ridge (linear) regression [38] (a
much simpler model), which took 55 seconds on a smaller-scale Insurance dataset (with only 14
features). We do acknowledgment that such comparisons are not very fair, as our proposal solves a
different and more complicated regression model; also some alternatives implemented additional
features. Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that our secure framework for regularized logistic
regression is efficient and competitive.
Table 1. Computational efficiency on evaluation datasets.
Dataset Insurance Parkinsons.Motor Parkinsons.Total Synthetic
# samples 9,822 5,875 5,875 1,000,000
# features 84 20 20 6
# iterations 8 6 6 6
Central runtime (S) 0.42 0.264 0.236 0.076
Total runtime (S) 3.77 2.017 2.352 12.76
Data transmitted (MB) 80 492 492 612
Overall, the repeated Newton-Raphson process converged within a limited number of itera-
tions, as evidenced by Fig. 3. Across all evaluation datasets, the models converged within 6 ∼
8 iterations. We set convergence criteria to be 10−10. Also, the amount of data to be exchanged
during computation is also modest. As an example, for the Synthetic dataset with 1 million
records, only around 612 megabytes of data are transmitted over the network.
To further demonstrate the efficiency of our method, we report time efficiency of its major
procedures (i.e., the central phase and the total runtime) in Table 1. We emphasize that the vast
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Figure 3. Model convergence (i.e., deviance) for all datasets (deviance smaller than the threshold
indicates convergence). All models converged within 6 ∼ 8 iterations. Note that the convergence
scores for the Parkinsons.Motor and Parkinsons.Total studies are so similar that they overlap on
the plot.
majority of runtime is spent at individual local institutions (on ordinary computations), and secure
computation at the Computation Centers only consumes around 11.14%, 13.09%, 10.03%, and 0.60%
of the total time for the datasets evaluated, respectively.
Scalability to Large Studies
With the advent of the big data era, large-scale collaborative studies are becoming ubiquitous in
many domains. A few notable examples include the International Cancer Genome Consortium
[14], the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) [44], and financial systematic risk
protection [45].
To meet the demand of large-scale cross-institution studies, we also demonstrate the scalability
of our framework. Since regression accuracy is not affected by the increase of participating
institutions, we mainly focus on evaluating the running time. To do so, we simulated studies with
up to 100 institutions, and reported the results in Figure 4 (we simplified the scenario by assuming
that each institution contributes 10000 records. So in fact, our evaluation reflects the running time
affected by the increase of both the number of institutions and the total number of data records).
It can be seen that the total time is always between 3.0 ∼ 3.3 seconds, exhibiting minimal
fluctuation as the number of participating institutions increases. This is especially the case for the
secure-computation-based centralized phase, which consistently takes only around 0.088 seconds.
Such a trend is well explained from a theoretical perspective (as evident in the computation
details in Algorithm 1, as individual institutions perform their local (distributed) computations
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Figure 4. Running time (in seconds) for the central phase and total computation respectively, as
the number of participating institutions increases. Negligible time fluctuation is present,
especially for the central (secure) computation.
simultaneously without interacting with (or waiting for) other participants. As a result, local
computations are relatively stable from the change. The increase of the number of institutions
does slightly influence the centralized aggregation of institution-level summary statistics, as
more summaries need to be transmitted and aggregated. But the effect is minimal, since the
summary data size is relatively small and the majority of computations for aggregating secret
shares occur locally at each Computation Center (as explained earlier regarding secure addition
and multiplication).
Overall, the evaluation has demonstrated that our secure framework could support large-scale
studies with hundreds of institutions and millions of data records.
Discussion
While the prototype implementation has already demonstrated impressive efficiency, we point
out that further speed-ups can be obtained for production systems. For instance, local data
can be cached in computer memory to greatly streamline and accelerate subsequent iterations
of computations; further acceleration can be gained locally by adopting high-performance pro-
gramming languages (e.g., C/C++) and libraries (e.g., BLAS/LAPACK [46]); as for the central
computation, it can also greatly benefit from multi-core parallelism, since many secure operations
can be parallelized naturally. In addition, the cryptography community continues to improve
efficiency of secure primitives which could be useful to us in future. In addition to Shamir’s
secret-sharing we used here [30], there are also several alternative schemes that prove to be useful
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on many tasks, such as Paillier encryption and Yao’s garbled circuit (as used by [13, 27, 38]). Due
to space constraint, we intend to explore other potential schemes for related tasks in future.
There have been various alternative proposals for protecting privacy while supporting regres-
sion analysis. Most of them only focused on much simpler regression models, such as linear (ridge)
regression, or standard logistic regression. And typically there is no or only weak protection
over summary statistics. Here we primarily review cryptography-related approaches, which are
directly relevant to our proposal. For instance, a privacy-preserving method was proposed for
(linear) ridge regression [38], which directly solves the linear system in secure centrally. Other
secure solutions [37, 39] for linear or logistic regression relied on some expensive secure primitives
and approximations, which add significant computational overhead and do not seem scalable to
large sample sizes. Increasingly, distributed-architecture-based solutions [6, 13, 23, 27] emerged as
very promising solutions for linear/logistic regression and related analytics. However, none of
them focused on regularized regression which is a more widely used model in practice. Many
related proposals [6] directly expose summary data from model fitting, leading to serious privacy
concerns over inference attacks on intermediate data [13, 25–27]. While others started to think
about protecting institutional summary information, the protections seem rather weak. For in-
stance, the obfuscation in [23] is vulnerable to collusion attacks by the center (who generates the
randomization noise) and any of the institutions, causing single points of failure/breach.
Our framework demonstrated here for regularized logistic regression differentiates in several
aspects. Firstly, we focus on an important and (more) widely-used statistical model that has not
been addressed by the security/privacy community. While there is recent privacy-preserving
work [38] specifically targeted for ridge (linear) regression (i.e., L2-regularization), it focused
on a much simpler regression model (i.e., linear regression) and the model estimation process
is completely different from regularized logistic regression. None of the other related works
considered regularization, despite its wide adoption and popularity in various application domains
as well as methodological development in statistics and machine learning. Secondly, for efficient
model estimation on regularized logistic regression, we adapted a distributed Newton method
that previously has only been validated on simpler analytical models [6]. The distributed
process makes our secure protocol for regularized logistic regression highly efficient compared
to a straightforward centralized implementation. Thirdly, we protect intermediate data and
computations with stronger cryptographic schemes [30], providing strong security guarantees
thanks to decentralization of trust while still allowing for efficient and flexible computation. Ours
is the first to safeguard intermediate data from regularized logistic regression. Among the two
closely related works, [6] failed to provide any protection over summaries; And [23] had very
weak protection as discussed earlier. Lastly, our model does not involve approximation or artificial
perturbation (contrary to solutions based on classical k-anonymity [20] or differential privacy [21])
on the data or computations, thus maintaining accuracy of the predictive model.
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Application Scenarios
We believe the proposed privacy-preserving framework is applicable to a wide range of domains
where the privacy/confidentiality of study participants and/or institutions is of concern. Here we
briefly describe a few representative application scenarios.
Genetic and Biomedical Studies. Genetic studies have enjoyed continued investigation efforts
with the ultimate goal of uncovering connections between genes and human traits (e.g., diseases).
Regularized logistic regression is an increasingly important tool for related applications, including
for genomic selection [28, 47], gene-gene interactions [4], GWAS [34], etc. Other biomedical studies
such as prediction of adverse drug reactions [48] are also potential application domains.
Many such studies rely on large-scale data sharing across institutions, while at the same time,
many such data involve sensitive data such as genome information, or participant phenotypes [13].
We envision that our framework can provide an automated and privacy-preserving solution for
supporting such collaborative investigations.
Analytics for Smart Grid. Smart electrical grid is a transformative technology that provides
detailed data pertaining to the monitoring and management of energy consumption of individual
households. Data sharing and analytics on such data have raised serious privacy concerns from
both everyday consumers and governmental regulators [49] due to various privacy inference
attacks on energy monitoring data. We believe that our distributed-computing-based technology
can support some useful analytics on smart grid data, such that household privacy could be
maintained.
Large-scale Network Analysis. Many important innovations involve analysis of social network
data, such as [8, 50, 51]. These include anomaly detection, novel discoveries in online social
networks (such as personalization and link prediction), etc. Social networks data often involve
person-level private information, making them inappropriate to share across institutions in large
collaborative studies. Our framework could serve the purpose by allowing for joint network
analysis without disclosing private information.
Conclusion
In this work, we focused on privacy protection for regularized logistic regression, a widely-used
statistical model in various domains. To make the model efficient in a secure setting, we adapted
a distributed method for model estimation. To further enhance privacy and prevent inference
attacks over intermediate data during model estimation, we introduced strong cryptographic
protections. These lead to an efficient framework for supporting regularized logistic regression
across institutions while guaranteeing strong privacy both for individual study participants and
institutions. Extensive empirical evaluations have demonstrated the efficacy of the framework in
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guaranteeing privacy with modest computational overhead. We hope that careful implementation
of our framework could enable a wider range of cross-institution joint analytics, which would
otherwise be impossible due to privacy or confidentiality concerns.
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